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Abstract
i
ABSTRACT 
 
While analyses of “North American integration” after NAFTA continue to stress outdated 
notions of country-to-country trade and the exchange of finished products across national 
borders, our paper starts from the premise that what we have now is a single, integrated regional 
economic system whose expansion has followed the pace and contours of business strategies 
emphasizing continentally-integrated supply chains, but whose management via regulatory and 
policy coordination has lagged dangerously behind. Most dangerous of all has been the massive 
gap between our region’s infrastructure needs – ports, transportation, and borders – and what has 
been coordinated and facilitated by the public sector. In this paper we investigate this current 
impasse from the point of view of reframing the competition with Asia’s export giants – in 
particular China – as an impetus to enhance the competitive edge not of our national economies 
but rather of the regional economic system as a whole.  We highlight the potential for synergy 
between the dynamism of cross-border regions such as the Pacific Northwest and their 
“gateway” strategies of coping with booming trade with Asia, on the one hand, and the aim of 
enhancing North American regional competitiveness via a more rationalized and effective 
continental transportation and infrastructure strategy.  For example, British Columbia’s plans to 
expand the Prince Rupert port facility, or the West Coast Corridor Coalition’s plans for 
transportation links “from B.C. [British Columbia] to B.C. [Baja California]” would do well to 
explore their potential to connect with developing transportation networks and trade corridors in 
the center of the continent, as well as emerging export centers on the Eastern seaboard 
(Halifax/Atlantica), and on Mexico’s Pacific coast.  In keeping with North America’s unique 
integration pattern – decentralized and business-driven – this focus on cross-border regions and 
public-private partnerships could bridge the infrastructure gap, linking local concerns with 
greater continental prosperity. 
 

Introduction
1
INTRODUCTION: THE NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
The conventional map of NAFTA shows three separate countries that trade with each 
other. We are told this is the world’s largest trade bloc, with the world’s largest trading 
relationship. This map is misleading. To be sure, North America is still comprised of three 
national governments, but the North American economy is no longer best visualized as three 
national economies. Rather it has evolved and is continuing to evolve as a deeply integrated 
continental system of stocks and flows, structured by linkages among production clusters and 
distribution hubs across the continent – linkages that rest on cross-border alignments among 
business, communities and local and state-provincial governments.  
 
Consequently, the three North American nations are not just trading partners, and what 
flows across their mutual borders are not mainly finished goods. Instead, their firms collaborate 
in complex, cross-border production, supply and distribution systems, some focused within 
specific cross-border regions, and many more connecting those regions across the continent, 
effectively forming a single tri-national production platform. For example, one quarter of the 
approximately $1.25 billion in goods that cross our two internal borders daily is automotive, but 
rather than selling cars to one another, we in North America build cars together. Within the 
North American region we also share increasingly integrated energy markets; use the same roads 
and railroads to transport jointly made products to market; service the same customers with an 
array of financial services; fly on the same integrated airline networks; and increasingly meet the 
same or similar standards of professional practice. The cumulative result of cross border trade 
and investment is for most practical purposes an integrated economy such that local practice in 
one part of the region accounts for results in another part of the region. This is what economists 
call “deep” or structural integration. 
 
To hear North American integration described as “deep” would surprise many skeptics in 
the academic community, particularly those whose conceptualizations of regional economic 
integration (REI) are based upon Europe as the model and the measure of the phenomenon.  
While it is true that the NAFTA agreement itself purposefully eschewed a top-down 
institutionalized approach and rejected policies such as a common currency, a regional 
parliament, and other identity-building exercises, we would argue that North America represents 
a different, alternative model of REI based upon three main pillars:  entrepreneurialism, 
decentralization, and (associated with the former two) adaptation.  NAFTA was itself not the 
starting point of regional integration on our continent:  by the late 1980s, when Mexico’s 
government accelerated trade liberalization and the US and Canada were negotiating their 
bilateral Free Trade Agreement, corporate strategies and investment decisions in all three 
countries were already shifting towards a regional, rather than simply national, perspective.1
Particularly influential was the end of the “branch plant” model based upon protectionist barriers 
to investment in Canada and Mexico, a model which also saddled U.S. companies with excess 
capacity at a time of tougher international competition and falling profit margins.  Canadian 
 
1 In the early 1990s, several key surveys of managers of US firms with long-established operations in Canada and
Mexico indicated that the US-Canada FTA and NAFTA had simply intensified trends already underway towards
continental-wide corporate strategies and organizations. See Stephen Krajewski, “Multinational Firms Across the
Canada-U.S. Border: An Investigation of Intrafirm Trade and Other Activities,” (Ottawa: Conference Board of
Canada, 1992); Jerry Haar and Stephen Blank, Making NAFTA Work: U.S. Firms and the New North American
Business Environment (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
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firms, always concerned about market access and access to larger pools of capital, found greater 
incentives to look south, while the end of “corporate welfare” with the dismantling of 
institutionalized protectionism in Mexico also chastened its previously risk-averse private sector 
and gave impetus to export orientation and the search for joint ventures.2 Even before NAFTA, 
and to an increasing extent after, intra-firm trade exploded, and just-in-time cross-border 
production, supply and distribution strategies further enhanced the efficiency and efficacy of 
North American business.  
 
The cumulative result of all this cross-border trade and investment has been, for most 
practical purposes, the development of an integrated regional economy based upon a degree of 
collaboration and complementarity between countries that is unprecedented.  But most notably, it 
is integration that has been driven “bottom-up” by businesses looking for new ways to expand 
and survive, and its evolution has been uneven and to some extent invisible on the national radar 
screens because it has accelerated in particular cross-border regions, moved along with help by 
adaptive and, in their own way, entrepreneurial subnational governments (i.e., local and 
state/provincial jurisdictions) enjoying relative autonomy within all three federalist systems.  
Freed – or, from a somewhat different political perspective, unleashed – from top-down 
government projects and planning, North American integration has deepened in an uneven, 
market-driven, de facto manner while sidestepping the paralyzing political battles over 
sovereignty that an attempt to adopt a European system would certainly have set off. 
 
While advocates of North American integration may have celebrated such an “under the 
radar” approach in the past, the challenge of expanding trade and competition with Asia raises 
the question regarding whether “North America, Inc.” can continue down this market-based, 
decentralized adaptive path into the future.  While business was pretty much able to retool itself 
in the 1980s, today’s new challenges reveal what the limits to bottom-up growth, specifically 
having to do with issues such as transportation, border infrastructure, and regulation.  It is both 
the scale of China’s export push (helped along with the expiration of the multifibre agreement) 
and the technological leaps made in transoceanic shipping that have raised concerns regarding 
the sorry state of North America’s ports, railways, and roads.  But such concerns naturally 
invoke the need of public authorities to take key investment decisions (whether public or public-
private or privatized) regarding these key nodes of municipal, state/provincial, and national 
infrastructure that now must serve trinational or regional economic interests.  Specifically, if 
North America is to “stay alive” and remain competitive in today’s global markets – by which 
we mean not a “Fortress North America” exclusionary strategy, but rather a strategy that seeks to 
attract both investment and trade from dynamic Asian economies by maximizing the competitive 
advantage of North America as a site of production, consumer markets, and innovation – the 
moment of truth has arrived regarding the unsexy but essential issue of the health and 
maintenance of the “plumbing” of the North American economic system. 
 
This paper presents an overview of this issue, first arguing that the architecture of North 
American supply chains – based upon corporate adaptations featuring their innovative use of 
transportation and logistics networks – has shifted from being the leading edge of the region’s 
competitiveness in the past two decades to being the leading edge of its vulnerability in a number 
 
2 For more on business adaptation in Mexico, see Strom C. Thacker, Big Business, the State, and Free Trade:
Constructing Coalitions in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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of ways.  Specifically, we argue that the regional economic system has reached the limits to 
“bottom-up” growth, and now requires a more integrated North American transportation strategy 
in order to adapt to an increasingly competitive global market environment.  The next section of 
the paper then focuses on North America’s growing trade with Asia, and discusses why and how 
Asia has become the focal point for broader discussions of North American competitiveness.  
The following section looks at how the cross-border region within NAFTA most obviously 
affected by these new trading patterns – namely, the Pacific Northwest – has adapted to these 
forces, and why this matters greatly for the entire North American economic system.  Finally, the 
concluding section identifies a coming crisis point in North American transportation 
infrastructure, and argues for regions like the Pacific Northwest, which stands at the leading edge 
of our continent’s move towards a new level of competitiveness, to rethink their particular 
interests as North American interests, and for stakeholder groups and their leaders to use those 
kinds of arguments with greater energy and precision, both to persuade their own constituents 
and to seek allies farther afield, continentally speaking.  With those coalitions in place, the kind 
of North American thinking and policymaking that will be required to confront, and overcome, 
the transportation crisis may have a fighting chance. 
 
NAFTA SUPPLY CHAINS:  SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
For many North American firms, a significant competitive advantage rests upon their 
capacity to build networks and supply chains that link regional specializations across national 
borders. For example, the North American auto supply chain stretches from parts manufactures 
in Mexico, through plants in the US to assembly operations in Canada. Components, parts and 
ultimately finished autos move along this extended production system. This is the case with 
virtually all of our leading companies, ranging from automotive products to aircraft components, 
to computers, to chemicals, to food products, housing products, pharmaceuticals, industrial 
goods such as subcomponents of manufacturing systems, as well as commodities and raw 
materials of every description.  
 
See Appendix, Table 1 
 
The ability to operate these networks efficiently depends on transportation and logistics 
capacities.  In a world of just-in-time production systems, transportation infrastructure and 
supply chain management become absolutely critical elements of business success – and even 
survival.  Advantages of location and service costs are multiplied by sophisticated control and 
optimization techniques aided by extensive use of GSP (Geo-Service Providing) and RFID 
(Radio Frequency Identification) technologies designed to monitor shipments at great distances.   
 
Clearly, then, the transportation, logistics, and border capacities have become the nerves 
and sinews of the North American economy. Like most of NAFTA, it is an emergent reality 
arising from millions of decisions starting with consumer demand and moving backward along 
the supply chain to bring about a substantial re-orientation of transportation networks in North 
America, from predominantly East-West (or West-East) to now North-South as well as East-
West. However, today’s resulting geography of ports and flows reflect a new balance: that 
between the land-based, North-South NAFTA trade flows and the newer shipping-based East-
West flows of the new, inter-regional face of globalization:  the boom of trade with Asia. This 
Staying Alive: North American Competitiveness   
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new balance between NAFTA trade and global markets is concentrated along the US borders and 
coastal regions plus some large cities.   
 
See Appendix, Map 
 
On the one hand, this, too, represents significant adaptation. This adaptation has been so 
good, in fact, that the volume of shipments is now hitting the limits of the system, specifically 
the limits of port technology and capacity, of rail capacity, and of infrastructure aging.  Unlike 
the first round of NAFTA adaptation, however, more than simply private sector strategic 
adaptation is now required.  What is needed, it appears, is a more effective continental 
transportation infrastructure that is adequate to the challenge of melding the NAFTA and global 
flows.  The question hanging over governments, entrepreneurs, and other ‘stakeholders’ in 
NAFTA-dependent and trade-dependent communities in our region, therefore, is whether the 
North American economic system can evolve to accommodate that challenge. By themselves, 
and by design, the three NAFTA national governments lack the formal mechanisms of 
cooperation, coordination, and, most importantly, implementation in order to launch the kinds of 
region-wide infrastructure projects that the European Union has successfully used to facilitate the 
movement of goods into, out of, and within its single market.  Therefore, we should not have 
been surprised that the increase in volumes of goods flowing across North America’s internal 
borders outran the capacity of our roads, bridges, railroads and border crossings even before 
9/11.  Today, North America’s transportation and border infrastructure barely suffice to support 
our economy; and given the obstacles to regional policy coordination, there is little margin left 
for future expansion.  
 
To be sure, one can argue that what is lacking is not simply institutionalized channels for 
cooperation, but also political will.  In practice, however, while governmental prioritizing can 
lead to the creation of new institutionalized channels, their effective coordination and operation 
is not a foregone conclusion.  Here, the management of North America’s internal borders since 
9-11 provides an instructive example.  No one can dispute that, following the terrorist attacks in 
2001 – though, perhaps, for different domestic, bilateral and global reasons – border security has 
become a top priority for all three governments.  Indeed, substantial efforts have been made to 
improve the physical infrastructure at border crossings in the past five years.  The US-Canada 
“Smart Border” agreement and the parallel agreement with Mexico represent key commitments 
to improve border management. Various organizations and border communities have initiated 
dialogues with government agencies that have achieved significant incremental improvement in 
border processes. Programs such as FAST and NEXUS also were developed and expanded to 
demonstrate that governments were doing their best to ensure security against terrorist threats 
without unduly interfering with cross-border commerce.  However, in practice there has been 
much that remains to be done, and the process as well as the disappointing outcome point to the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric of governmental prioritization and the reality of institutional 
confusion.  The pyramiding of requirements and programs, each of which can inhibit quick 
border processing, and all of which together require high degrees of inter-agency coordination 
(and typically involve federal, state and even local governments) as well as new levels of 
cooperation with business and border communities, has created tumult in some instances and 
North American Trade with Asia
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threatens what Stephen Flynn calls “a potential train wreck”3 Thus, even at the geographic place 
where North American regional interests would have the greatest salience, and in a high-priority 
issue area for all three governments – and, arguably, publics – the ability to forge a North 
American solution to a North American problem remains elusive. 
 
Considerably less attention has been paid to developing a sense of a North American 
transportation and logistics structure; instead, rhetoric has run high, while vested interests have 
controlled the policy process to the detriment of greater national and North American interests. 
People have talked about “NAFTA Superhighways” for a decade, and it has been clear since the 
mid-1980s that increased volumes of goods flowing north and south demand new approaches to 
transportation infrastructure.  Washington has spent vast sums in a series of highway funding 
bills since 1991 to identify and improve “high priority corridors” that would facilitate north-
south trade. However, these funds became a pot into which every member of Congress dipped 
his/her fingers. The number of designated high priority corridors soared as members earmarked 
funds for their own favored projects.  
 
See Appendix, Table 2 
 
The result is that the map of so-called “high priority corridors” looks like a plate of 
spaghetti. Highways and border crossings have been improved here and there, but there is no 
movement toward developing a true North American highway system. Certainly nothing like the 
super multimodal corridors, wired with fiber-optics and the latest digital frills, has come about. If 
anything, the general state of US highways has deteriorated over the past decade. In its latest 
“Report Card,” the American Society of Civil Engineers awards the American government a D- 
for maintaining existing roads and bridges. The US is $40 billion behind just in maintaining 
existing roads.4 Add to this the challenge of bringing Mexico’s roads into the 21st century;  the 
joint project of fixing crumbling bridges and overburdened access points across both internal 
borders;  the need to construct “inland ports” to connect incoming containers to both rail and 
road routes towards the North American interior and beyond;  and the continued distortions of 
local “pork-driven” incentives, and the outlook for trinational regional coordination on this 
critical issue starts to look decidedly bleak. 
 
NORTH AMERICAN TRADE WITH ASIA 
 
At this point, it is important to recall that the outlook for the future of the pre-NAFTA 
North American economies in the early 1980s was also decidedly bleak – given stagflation in the 
US, the debt crisis in Mexico, and the collapse of oil prices affecting both Canada and Mexico 
(and their respective experiments with protectionist economic policies).  But it was at this time, 
facing this bleak picture, that businesses in the US, Mexico and Canada responded by retooling 
and revamping their corporate strategies, and began to make use of innovations in technology 
and supply-chain management techniques to bring us the North American economic system we 
have today.  In the past few years, echoing the shock of the early ’80s, fears of the onslaught of 
 
3 See Stephen Flynn, “The False Conundrum: Continental Integration Versus Homeland Security,” in Peter Andreas
and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security
Context (Routledge, New York & London, 2003)
4 American Society of Civil Engineers (http://www.asce.org/reportcard/index.cfm?reaction=full&page=6#roads)
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Chinese cheap manufactures have produced a similar sense of dread, most notably in Mexico, 
which had thought that NAFTA guaranteed it a preferential market for these low-value added 
exports.  But there has also been a more positive shock to the North American economic system 
from Asia:  the inflow of investment from China matching the historic inflows from Japan, 
coupled with China’s hunger for raw materials plentiful in all three NAFTA countries, arguably 
have opened up a range of opportunities for the region to attract the business of this new global 
economic superpower.  Indeed, the challenge to North America’s competitive advantage as a 
region is not necessarily whether we can outproduce and outsell China or Asia per se, but 
whether we can adapt effectively to the new global environment, which would ideally mean the 
inclusion of North America into rapidly expanding and dynamic globalized production networks 
that encompass our own businesses and those of Asia.   
 
There has been some recent evidence that this theme of regional (vs. national) “North 
American competitiveness” has some traction in the halls of power in all three NAFTA countries 
as a potential organizing principle for a new phase of post-NAFTA integration.  Three recent 
reports speak directly to the issue of North American competitiveness. The first, entitled 
“Building a North American Community,” was drafted by a Task Force sponsored by the 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, and 
the Council on Foreign Relations.5 The second was the “Report to Leaders, Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America,” presented in June 2005 by the three NAFTA nations’ 
foreign ministers in compliance with the stated goal of the Waco trilateral leaders’ summit to 
produce a set of goals for the new SPP (including a timetable for incremental steps) within 90 
days of the summit meeting.6 Both of these reports underline the need to press forward in 
building a seamless North American economic system as the foundation for prosperous and 
growing US, Canadian, and Mexican communities in the 21st century.  However, the third report, 
the most recent Report to Leaders submitted by the “Security” and “Prosperity” ministers of the 
three governments in August 2006, goes one step further, and announces the creation of what is 
called a “North American Competitiveness Council,” adopting the new buzzword of 
competitiveness for the name of what is to be the main consultative body of the private sector to 
the SPP process.7
And although the SPP’s stated aims do maintain a distinctly nation-based outlook that 
belies a zero-sum view of “competitiveness” (i.e., implying that the goal is to give North 
American businesses an edge to “beat out” businesses from other regions), the global nature of 
so many North American businesses which are to be the main “stakeholders” for the SPP augurs 
 
5 Building a North American Community: Report of the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), also available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8102. The Task
Force Chairs were John Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William Weld; Vice-Chairs, Thomas d’Aquino, Andres Rosental,
and Robert Pastor. This report was released prior to the trilateral leaders’ summit at Waco, Texas, on March 23,
2005.
6 The report, dated June 27, 2005, and its detailed appendices outlining the “Security” and “Prosperity” agendas and
the timetable for meeting incremental goals in each, are available at
http://www.spp.gov/report_to_leaders/index.asp.
7 See Report to Leaders, August 2006, available at http://www.spp.gov/2006_report_to_leaders/index.asp. The
initiative for the NACC was first announced at the trinational leaders’ summit in Cancún, Mexico, on March 31,
2006, the first attended by newly-elected Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper. For the names of the
Canadian members, see the press release on Prime Minister Harper’s official site, June 13, 2006,
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1200.
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for a push to make the region attractive for both trade and investment.  Looking now a year later, 
while SPP has been virtually invisible in the public eye, its working groups have been quietly 
moving ahead on a few of its more ambitious goals, such as a North American steel strategy via 
a new North American Steel Trade Committee (NASTC).8 And in the area of transportation, the 
SPP’s “Prosperity” agenda includes the goals of “improv[ing] the safety and efficiency of North 
America’s transportation system by expanding market access, facilitating multimodal corridors, 
reducing congestion, and alleviating bottlenecks at the border.”9 Indeed, the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT) lists as its participation in SPP 11 proposed projects under nine separate 
sub-agencies, including a US-Mexico Mass Transit Border Project, joint rail inspections, a North 
American Transportation Statistics Interchange, and a project on short sea shipping.10 
While the active participation of numerous government agencies and the promises of 
trinational cooperation are encouraging, the question becomes whether the pressure on the 
region’s infrastructure coming from the Asian trade boom will be enough to push ahead the more 
continental, multi-modal approach to transportation that is needed at this time.  There is still a 
need to develop trinational statistics which can then be used as a vehicle for two key 
policymaking priorities:  weighing alternative means to expand North American port capacity 
and judging how much new capacity may be required under different economic scenarios.  It is 
not at all clear that enough mid-level public servants, let alone leaders in the policymaking 
process, have begun to think either in continental terms or in network centric multi-modal terms. 
Specifically, possibly because of the continued political “third rail” of sovereignty,11 projects that 
hint at tri-partite harmonization of highway policies have gotten little public airing, despite their 
patent rationality. Reducing inter-modal switching costs and generating ways to ensure flow 
optimization end to end among all transportation modes are also key to coping with new global 
flows, which are mostly containerized and need to be transported inland in the most cost-
effective (and safest) way.  Improving competitiveness for the continent requires more attention 
to multi-modal transport, rather than thinking of transportation as separate silos – rail, road, 
water, air.  But perhaps most profoundly, this new challenge will require stakeholders in the 
public and private sectors to view the North American economic system as a whole that is not 
only greater than the sum of its parts, but is also critically dependent upon the dynamic – and 
 
8 See North American Steel Trade Committee (NASTC), “North American Steel Strategy,” available at
http://www.spp.gov/pdf/NASTC_steel_strategy.pdf.
9 See U.S. Department of Commerce, “Security and Prosperity Partnership,” available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/S-
3/sppcover.htm.
10 See U.S. Department of Commerce, “DOT Security & Prosperity Partnership of North America Initiatives,”
available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/S-3/sppinitiatives.htm
11 For example, the SPP’s official U.S. site includes a “Myth vs. Fact” section which seeks to dispel ideas about the
SPP (presumably present in the U.S. public’s mind) such as: “the SPP is a movement to merge the United States,
Mexico and Canada into a North American Union and establish a common currency,” “the SPP infringes on the
sovereignty of the United States,” and “the SPP creates a NAFTA-plus legal status between the three countries.”
See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), “Myth vs. Fact,” available at
http://www.spp.gov/myths_vs_facts.asp. Canadian and Mexican popular and political concerns about sovereignty
vis à vis the United States are also deeply rooted historically and arguably held in check a century of North-South
economic integration before their policies started shifting in the 1980s. See Stephanie R. Golob, “Beyond the Policy
Frontier: Canada, Mexico, and the Ideological Origins of NAFTA,” World Politics 55 (April 2003): 361-398.
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above all, efficient – interchange among its constituent regions, clusters, and supply chain 
locations. Thus, the development of transportation infrastructure in one subregion, such as the 
expansion of ports in the Pacific Northwest with an eye to the expanding trade with Asia, is not 
merely a vehicle for expanding bilateral trade between the US or Canada and China; it is – or can 
be – an investment in the infrastructure that will permit the whole North American continental 
region to consolidate and expand economic competitiveness in this era of global trade and 
production. 
 
GATEWAY TO ASIA, OR TO NOWHERE:   
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST IN NORTH AMERICA 
 
In his influential book on Ontario as a “North American region-state,” Thomas 
Courchene challenged us to rethink the economic geography of our continent, and the role 
played by our subnational political units in our national economies, and in a larger continental 
system. As Courchene observes: “It is not just that nearly all Canada’s provinces are more 
integrated (in terms of exports) internationally than east-west, but also that Canada’s regions, 
which in some cases would incorporate more than one province, are economically/industrially 
quite distinct from one another. … This means that it is time to view Canada as a series of north-
south, cross-border economies with quite distinct industrial structures.”12 More recently, 
journalistic attention has been focused on “Mexamerica,” or “Amexica,” the borderlands that 
span the US-Mexican border, as either possessing or developing a distinct economic and cultural 
space,13 while scholarly and policy attention has raised the profile of what Canada’s Policy 
Research Initiative (PRI) has identified as North America’s “cross-border regions,” which are 
characterized primarily by “substantial economic links, socio-cultural similarities, and the 
presence of cross-border organization.”14 What this last definition highlights, and what we are 
arguing in this paper, is that while the functional necessity of cooperation has driven North 
American integration across national borders, it is the quality and quantity of organization – the 
formal and informal mechanisms allowing local and vested interests in both the public and 
private sectors to advance common regional interests – that holds the key to its optimization.  
That is, while British Columbia is closely tied economically with Washington and Oregon, and 
may share social and cultural characteristics, what will ultimately matter for its own future 
competitiveness, and its contribution to North American competitiveness, will be as much 
political will as economic muscle. 
 
As trade from Asia booms and transportation infrastructure is pressed to its limits, the 
need to organize and cooperate on issues of cross-border interest has become all the more 
pressing for the states and provinces in the Pacific Northwest zone, known more romantically as 
“Cascadia” (which hints at a secessionist spirit) and more bureaucratically as the Pacific 
 
12 Thomas J. Courchene with Colin R. Telmer, From Heartland to North American Region States; The Social,
Fiscal and Federal Evolution of Ontario (Monograph Series on Public Policy, Centre for Public Management,
University of Toronto, 1998), p. 289.
13 The former was featured in Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981);
the latter was preferred by The Economist in its survey of Mexico in the early days of NAFTA. See “Welcome to
Amexica! A Survey of Mexico.” The Economist (October 28, 1995).
14 See Policy Research Initiative, North American Linkages Project, “Briefing Note: Canada-U.S. Relations and the
Emergence of Cross-Border Regions” (February 2006), available at
http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/XBorder_BN_e.pdf.
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Northwest Economic Region (PNWER).  It is this latter grouping which will be the focus of this 
section, as PNWER represents precisely what PRI’s definition had in mind in terms of matching 
economic interest with organization.  PNWER, a public-private partnership, began its life as the 
Pacific NorthWest Legislative Leadership Forum (PNLLF) in 1989, and by 1991 PNWER in its 
present form was established by statute in Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington 
State on the U.S. side, and Alberta, British Columbia, and Yukon on the Canadian side.15 Its 
sophisticated governance structure includes the premiers and state governors, as well as a 
number of standing Working Groups, among them groups on Transportation (est. 1993), Export 
(1994;  renamed Trade and Finance in 1997), and Agriculture (1995).  As of 1994 the Working 
Groups have been directed by a Private Sector Council, adding a dimension of consultation and 
information exchange with public sector/elected officials.16 Not surprisingly, PNWER  -- “with 
its 17 different working groups and memberships that include premiers, governors, legislators, 
counties, economic development commissions, industry associations, and private sector 
members”17 – is cited in the PRI report as evidence of how the “thickness and intensity” of cross-
border relations is greatest in the Northwest region.18 
With all of this organizational sophistication, it is not surprising that PNWER’s list of 
accomplishments impresses.  Particularly notable have been its efforts across a variety of 
working group areas to improve the exchange of information and the generation of binational 
statistics in order to improve policy planning, most notably in its Environmental Technology 
Working Group and its Export (now Trade and Investment) Working Group.  Another hallmark 
of PNWER’s efforts which speaks to the ability to frame issues regionally (cross-border) is what 
might be called its diplomatic work.  For example, in the thorny bilateral zone of confrontation 
known as softwood lumber, back in 1994 PNWER’s Forest Products Working Group (at the 
request of British Columbia) worked towards the drafting of a set of common forestry principles 
which could serve as a reference for the region.  Finally, it bears noting that, while PNWER has 
not been in operation even two decades, its relative longevity among North American cross-
border regional organizations gives it influence with both national governments as what the PRI 
has called a “laboratory for policy innovation,” citing PNWER’s role in developing the NEXUS 
program;19 and among more recent arrivals to the cross-border region community (such as the 
Desert Pacific Region spanning the Mexico-U.S. border20), both as a model and as an active 
advisor. 
 
In the area of transportation, however, PNWER’s most recent activities have been hardly 
innovative.  In its Transportation Working Group’s submission of Resolutions and Actions 
Points for their 2006 annual meeting, the topics included moving forward with the Pacific 
Gateway Strategy,21 though no specific proposals are offered;  better communication with other 
 
15 Unless otherwise indicated, information on PNWER is available on the PNWER website, http://www.pnwer.org.
For a detailed chronology of what PNWER identifies as its “History of Accomplishments,” see
http://pnwer.org/background/accomplishments.htm.
16 See “PNWER: History,” available at http://pnwer.org/background/history2.htm.
17 PRI, “Briefing Note,” p. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 5.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 For the legislation, see http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/desertpacificeconomic.htm
21 For Transport Canada’s press release on the Pacific Gateway Strategy, see
http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2005/05-gc013e.htm
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working groups;  generic calls for greater attention to North-South cross-border transportation, 
particularly given the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver; and the decision to draft a letter of support 
to the Canadian government for a specific policy initiative.22 Where the innovation, or 
dynamism, seems to have been concentrated most recently, not surprisingly, is in the area of 
infrastructure security: PNWER has sponsored a Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security 
(PRIS, launched in October 2001), launched a Puget Sound Partnership for Regional 
Infrastructure Security in line with the PRIS model, and participates in the Blue Cascades 
exercises designed to study “critical infrastructure interdependencies.”23 All of these initiatives 
are arguably of utmost importance to the citizens of the PNWER region, and reflect their vital 
concerns regarding terrorist threats and emergency response.  On the US side, they also reflect 
the real need for regions and local communities to compete for limited Department of Homeland 
Security funding.  But the lack of a comprehensive transportation vision – even one that is 
overly-ambitious, such as the one presented by the Cascadia Project’s Bruce Agnew and Bruce 
Chapman in their recent policy paper on corridors24 – speaks to the danger that PNWER has 
become very much like any American special interest group, which is responsive to its 
constituency’s narrow concerns rather than articulating a broader view of how their constituents 
will benefit into the future as a part of a continental economic system.  As we have mentioned 
earlier, North America’s vast and daunting transportation challenge cannot be met without the 
identification of, and energizing of, a community of North American “stakeholders” who will see 
and press for the kinds of innovations that will overcome local rivalries and vested interests to 
make the region’s transportation network efficient and its continental economy attractive to 
exporters, importers, and investors, both in Asia and around the globe. What the PNWER 
example shows is that sophisticated organizations, such as public-private partnerships, are only 
part of the answer to how cross-border regions can contribute to improving future North 
American competitiveness.  The other part lies in leadership – by individuals and organizations, 
mayors and oilmen, consumer groups and small-town exporters – who “get it” and can persuade 
others that they have “North American interests” in transportation. 
 
Moreover, as part of a post-Asian boom strategy, there is a need for greater innovation in 
terms of how cross-border regions identify themselves within the continental economic system, 
another challenge for leadership. New or expanded ports, like the one proposed for Prince Rupert 
in British Columbia, must be conceived of not as simply a “gateway” between Canada and Asia, 
but rather as the interchange point of containers into – and outward from -- the North American 
economy.  A Pacific Gateway Strategy that speeds the inward flow of Asian containers at a new 
Prince Rupert Port facility only to see them dumped in the Chicago rail yards would scarcely be 
a victory. The point is that Vancouver, Montreal, and Halifax can also be viewed – and view 
themselves – as North American ports, each of which could then be expanded to expedite larger 
flows of goods not only into Canada, but to the US and, quite possibly, Mexico.  To benefit the 
 
22 PNWER, “Transportation Action Points/Resolutions,” summarized and available for download at
http://pnwer.dataweb.com/resolutions.view.
23 See http://pnwer.org/pris.index.htm
24 See Bruce Agnew and Bruce Chapman, “How Do We Get To There From Here? A Transportation Future for the
Puget Sound Region,” Cascadia – The Discovery Institute (no date), available at http://www.cascadiaproject.org
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local communities as well as the rest of North America into the future, port development must be 
seen in context of continental trade flows with Asia and in context of a continental transport 
system. 
 
“Inland ports” are also important in this strategy, both because of their obvious virtue of 
decongesting their related maritime ports, and because they can aid in homeland security 
screening.  But there is also a North American advantage, as inland ports can transform 
themselves into continental hubs.  Here, the key players are likely to be cities, and their main 
vehicle will be the trade corridor movement.  North America’s trade corridors can be formed 
along highways, or combine road and rail;  many are made up of geographically contiguous sites 
connected North-South, though some of the more innovative ones have been formed through a 
creative reimagining of geographic location.  Kansas City, Missouri, for example, has done just 
that, transforming itself from a modest Midwestern hub and the home of the “Mexiplex,” a 
building housing the Kansas City-Mexico Business Development Corporation, as well as trade 
desks for various Mexican cities and states.25 Kansas City officials have also entered into talks 
with Winnipeg, to bring the Canadian presence there as a way to underscore their North 
American regional strategy.  In the Pacific Northwest, there has been a trade corridor movement; 
indeed, back in 1999, PNWER, together with the Cascadia Project, launched the Inland 
Corridors Project.26 In 2001, the West Coast Corridor Coalition (WCCC) then sought funding 
for an outreach initiative, to extend the corridor, “From B.C. to B.C.,” meaning British Columbia 
in Canada to Baja California in Mexico, and north to Alaska.27 This project, funded by the US 
DOT, potentially covered 1,500 miles of the West Coast that has become critically congested 
(approximately half of all container cargo transits through West Coast ports) and where the 
burden of this congestion (environmental, employment, etc,) has fallen on local communities.  
Like PNWER, and in all likelihood following its model, the WCCC is a public-private 
partnership, with a private sector advisory group, that has a somewhat broader view 
geographically and yet a more narrow view as a trade and transportation corridor.  However, 
because of the economic clout of this expanded, trinational corridor in an age of booming Asian 
trade, the WCCC has a better chance of attracting federal government attention, possibly through 
the SPP.  But to truly impact North American competitiveness, this North-South group will need 
to look East-West within North America as well, looking for ways to line up support for better 
road and rail links between its ports (maritime and inland) and the heartland of the US, for 
example, or connecting Alaska and northern British Columbia with eastern Canada via Midwest 
US or Canadian “hubs.”  This North American strategy, rather than the “cross-border region” 
approach, may be the way the Pacific Northwest can best leverage its geography for its own 
benefit, while benefiting the North American regional economy more broadly. 
 
25 Kansas City, International Affairs and Trade Office, “The Mexiplex: What We Do,”
http://www.kcmo.org/international.nsf/web/tradedesk
26 PNWER, History of Accomplishments, Transportation Work Group, at
http://pnwer.org/background/accomplishments.htm.
27 Bruce Agnew, “From B.C. to B.C….and Beyond,” presentation to the 15th Annual Meeting of the Pacific
Northwest Economic Region, Westin Hotel, Seattle, Washington, July 14-18, 2005. Available at
http://www.pnwer.org/meetings/Summer2005/Presentations/Trns1/Trns1_Agnew_WCCC.pdf#search=%22west%2
0coast%20corridor%20coalition%22
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THE COMING CRISIS POINT IN NORTH AMERICA’S  
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Transportation provides a particularly important example of the need for thinking in 
North American terms. Despite the enormous sums that have been spent on roads in the past 
decade, and despite the fact that there are many people and institutes involved in transportation 
issues, there is still have little sense of what a North American transportation system might look 
like. Many specialists agree that we are approaching a major decision point in the North 
American economic system.   
 
Unlike Europe’s experience where governments played a much larger initiating role, 
building the North American economic system has been very much a bottom-up process, driven 
by corporate strategies and structures. NAFTA can be seen as a response by governments to 
developments already underway in the North American economy – as efforts to bring regulatory 
frameworks into line with this emerging economic system. We have now reached the limits to 
bottom-up integration. Decisions on vital issues like transportation and borders – and on energy 
and immigration --  must be made, based upon more sophisticated conceptualizations of what 
“North American” options would best serve our continent’s interests in these sectors. 
Policymakers and stakeholders alike have to think outside of their local, national, and sectoral 
boxes, to consider what a North American economic system might look like in 10 or 20 or 50 
years, and how they could best benefit from its future consolidation. But most of all, given the 
weak institutional framework provided by the NAFTA accord itself and the growing recognition 
that the private sector cannot simply adapt its way towards this next level of efficiency, there has 
to be a rigorous, fair, effective, clear-sighted, and transparent process through which these 
decisions can be made.  Among the many questions to be answered are: 
• Should we seek to improve Long Beach-LA port capacity or open access to Mexico’s 
deep-water Pacific ports?   
• Should we improve highway connections across the US-Canada and US-Mexico borders 
or should we look for ways to increase rail coverage?  
• If a new post-Panamax port is built at Prince Rupert, how can 8 or 10,000 containers be 
moved efficiently to the main North American hubs given limited road and rail capacity 
in Western Canada?  
• What about short sea shipping corridors along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts? 
How much would this relieve land congestion?   
 
Unfortunately, no agency or organization has been mandated to come up with answers to 
questions such as these, nor is there any blueprint for how a “North American” transportation 
strategy would be implemented. There are very few historical examples of successful 
transportation policies in the US and Canada, though the successes did play an outsized role in 
both countries’ aims of building national economies (in the case of Canada, designed specifically 
to create an East-West orientation to counterbalance the North-South ties deemed dangerous to 
the integrity of the nation).  Building a “national road” was a key (though unfulfilled) objective 
in the early days of the United States, while President Lincoln took the lead in building a 
transcontinental railroad. Canada built the Trans-Canada highway and railroad, the latter the 
centerpiece of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald’s push for national unity (and his own 
political legacy) in the late nineteenth century. In the US, President Eisenhower was able to build 
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the Interstate system a half century ago. What can we learn from these experiences?  More 
specifically, can we learn from these experiences how to link ourselves together in an open 
regional economic system, one which depends upon the open circulation of goods up and down 
supply chains, and that is not aiming for political unity or to keep trade out, but to compete for 
the flows of trade and the economic prosperity they promise? 
 
These unanswered questions, and the issues of infrastructure investment they reflect, may 
not seem as pressing as the more newsworthy threats to our security, but for the future of 
economic competitiveness of our region the stakes could not be higher.  The weakening of our 
transportation infrastructure will limit our ability to compete in global markets in coming 
decades and will give overseas competitors with access to more modern and efficient 
transportation systems a substantial advantage.  Inadequate transportation infrastructure also 
limits the growth of particular North American regions. The inadequacies of Mexico’s physical 
infrastructure are well known, particularly in the south. Meanwhile, similar problems affect the 
Atlantic Provinces, which, along with northern New England, are in danger of being left behind 
as a “geographic backwater” in the new North American economic system.28 But as we have 
seen, the problem also extends to a region like the Pacific Northwest, less from a point of view of 
relative backwardness (though there certainly are poor rural and lumber areas in Washington 
State and British Columbia), and more from the inability of aging and inadequate infrastructure 
to keep pace with the explosion of Asian trade, making the region a victim of its own success in 
a manner of speaking.  In this paper, we have argued that what needs to change is not only 
funding and organization of those who seek to improve the state of North America’s 
transportation infrastructure, but also the mindset.  There needs to be a recognition that a region 
like the Pacific Northwest, which perhaps stands to gain the most from the boom in the Asian 
economies, is also bearing a burden for our entire continental economic system as its 
transportation system reaches its limits.  Cross-border regional groups and trade corridor 
coalitions can play a vital role in this process, but it must be one with a broader vision than 
merely to survive or to line their own nests.  Their strongest argument for (bi-, or even tri-) 
national attention to their plight is not that they are special, but rather that they are not –  that is, 
to take that next leap in global competitiveness, the entire North American transportation system 
needs an overhaul, and this would be a great place to start. 
 
28 See AIMSs
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